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“Private” Cybersecurity Standards?
Cyberspace Governance,
Multistakeholderism, and the
(Ir)relevance of the TBT Regime
Shin-yi Peng†
Introduction
An increasingly connected world has brought more sophisticated
cybersecurity threats.  Although not all instances are disclosed, outbreaks
of cyber hacks on governments and companies have been featured in the
headlines in recent years.  Yahoo! Inc., for example, lost more than 500
million user accounts,1 which “may have included names, email addresses,
telephone numbers, dates of birth, hashed passwords (using MD5) and, in
some cases, encrypted or unencrypted security questions and answers.”2
The breaches forced Yahoo to renegotiate its sale to Verizon Communica-
tions Inc., cutting the price by $350 million.3  In a similar case, the Infor-
mation Commissioner’s Office (ICO) of the UK slapped Telecom’s TalkTalk
with a record £400,000 fine for failing to keep personal data secure, which
“allowed cyber attackers to access customer data ‘with ease.’”4
† Professor of Law, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan. An earlier version of
this Article was presented at the European Society of International Law (ESIL) Annual
Conference “Global Public Goods, Global Commons and Fundamental Values: The
Responses of International Law,” Naples, Italy, on 7-9 September 2017.  I thank the
participants at the ESIL Conference for their comments.
1. Mark Fahey & Nick Wells, Yahoo Data Breach Is Among the Biggest in History,
CNBC (Sept. 26, 2016, 11:19 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/22/yahoo-data-
breach-is-among-the-biggest-in-history.html [https://perma.cc/RL7F-5LWN].
2. Yahoo Security Notice December 14, 2016, YAHOO, https://help.yahoo.com/kb/
SLN27925.html (follow “What information was taken in the August 2013 incident?”
drop-down option) [https://perma.cc/3W6V-JY8Q].
3. Michael Liedtke & Tali Arbel, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Yahoo Salvages Verizon Deal with
$350 Million Discount, YAHOO FINANCE (Feb. 21, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/
news/yahoo-salvages-verizon-deal-350-132641836.html [https://perma.cc/8UC7-
PWLH].
4. The attacker accessed the personal data of 156,959 customers including their
names, addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers, and email addresses.  In 15,656 cases,
the attacker also had access to bank account details and sort codes.  The ICO’s investiga-
tion found that an attack on the company could have been prevented if TalkTalk had
taken basic steps to protect customers’ information.  ICO (UK) NEWS, Talktalk Gets
Record £400,000 Fine for Failing to Prevent October 2015 Attack (Oct. 5, 2016), https://
ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2016/10/talktalk-gets-record-
400-000-fine-for-failing-to-prevent-october-2015-attack/ [https://perma.cc/L5MA-4F5R];
see also Keely Rushmore, ICO Issues Record £400,000 Monetary Penalty Notice for Talktalk
Data Breach, SA LAW (Dec. 20, 2016), https://salaw.com/views-insight/keely-rushmore-
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These examples signal a clear desire for stronger personal data secur-
ity.  The range of consequences for security failures are substantial, includ-
ing civil financial losses and even criminal liabilities.  We are now living in
a hyper-connected world, with a myriad of devices continuously linked to
the Internet.  Our growing dependence on such devices exposes us to a
variety of cybersecurity threats.5  This ever-increasing connectivity means
that vulnerabilities can be introduced at any phase of the software develop-
ment cycle.6  Cybersecurity risk management, therefore, is more important
than ever to governments at all developmental stages as well as to compa-
nies of all sizes and across all sectors.7  The awareness of cybersecurity
threats affects the importance placed on the use of standards and certifica-
tion as an approach.8
Establishing cybersecurity standards enhances security and contrib-
utes to risk management by helping to establish common security require-
ments and capabilities needed for secure solutions.9  While it is impossible
to eliminate all threats, cybersecurity standards make it harder for attacks,
or at least reduce the effect of attacks that do occur.10  The overall goal of
cybersecurity standards is to improve the security of information technol-
ogy systems, networks, and critical infrastructures.11  Typically, cyber-
security standards define functional and assurance requirements, policies
for managing information, criteria for evaluating security measures, tech-
niques for addressing security failures, and procedures for the monitoring
of security breaches.12  Technically speaking, such standards are very
diverse, ranging from the mathematical definition of a cryptographic
algorithm to the specification of security features in a web browser.13  Ide-
emp-ico-issues-record-400000-monetary-penalty-notice-for-talktalk-data-breach/ [https:/
/perma.cc/9ZKJ-CV83].
5. See E.U. AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY (ENISA), Governance
Framework for European Standardization 8 (July 1, 2016), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/
publications/policy-industry-research [https://perma.cc/354C-U59U].
6. See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 69– 83 (2012); see generally Rolf H.
Weber, Internet of Things: New Security and Privacy Challenges, 26 COMPUTER L. &
SECURITY REV. 23 (2010). See generally P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBERSECURITY
AND CYBERWAR: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 34 (2014).
7. E.U. AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY (ENISA), Definition of
Cybersecurity— Gaps and Overlaps in Standardisation 8 (July 1, 2016), https://www.enisa
.europa.eu/publications/definition-of-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/F5AY-3XW4].
See generally Shin-yi Peng, Cybersecurity Threats and the WTO National Security Excep-
tions, 18 J. OF INT’L ECOM. L., 449 (2015).
8. PWC & DEP’T. FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS (BIS), UK CYBER SECURITY
SKILLS RESEARCH REPORT 4 (Nov. 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/261681/bis-13-1294-uk-cyber-security-
standards-research-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4KW-CBFF].
9. See generally William Stallings, Standards for Information Security Management,
10 INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 10 (2007).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See also INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO), ISO/IEC 27001:2013, https://
www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:27001:ed-2:v1:en [https://perma.cc/Z883-AE63]
(last visited Aug. 12, 2018).
13. Id.
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ally, “security standards facilitate sharing of knowledge and best practices
by helping to ensure common understanding of concepts, terms, and defi-
nitions, which prevents errors.”14  On the other hand, “when cybersecurity
standards are not available . . . [businesses] may not have reliable informa-
tion . . . on what . . . security controls may be needed . . . [which] tends to
lead to . . . insufficient security maintenance” if not unsafe
implementations.15
It should be noted that this research focuses on international trade in
goods rather than trade in services.16  While estimates vary, experts fore-
see that, by 2020, the Internet of Things (IoT) will connect 26 billion
devices worldwide.17  The large-scale use of IoT technologies could have a
range of implications and create various trade issues.18  Among other
issues, greater technical standardization can reduce the barriers to entry to
IoT markets.  To illustrate, if devices from different manufacturers do not
use the same cybersecurity standards, interoperability will require extra
gateways to translate from one standard to another.19  Without effective
14. KAREN SCARFONE, DAN BENIGNI, TIM GRANCE, NIST, CYBER SECURITY STANDARDS
(2009), available at http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=152153
[https://perma.cc/H8JZ-NZJK].
15. Id.  See generally Marjory S. Blumenthal, Finding Security in the Clouds, in REGU-
LATING THE CLOUD: POLICY FOR COMPUTING INFRASTRUCTURE 61– 86 (Christopher S. Yoo &
Jean-Franc¸ois Blanchette eds., 2015).
16. However, this research does not aim to cover the rules of the GATS.  Thus, Chap-
ter IV does not deal with cybersecurity standards in the context of trade in services, i.e.,
GATS Article VI:5(a).  According to the negotiating papers, “technical standards” are
measures that lay down the characteristics of a service or the manner in which it is
supplied.  Technical standards also include the procedures relating to the enforcement of
such standards.  Domestic cybersecurity regulation is therefore arguably a “technical
standard” within the meaning of Article VI:4/5. See Working Party on Domestic Regula-
tion, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Pursuant to GATS Article VI:4, Informal Note
by the Chairman, Room Document, 20 March 2009, para. II:5, available at https://
www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/AN_SV12_The-Draft-GATS-Domes
tic-Regulation-Disciplines_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/74Z6-LN2P] (last visited Aug. 12,
2018).  For cybersecurity issues under the GATS, see Shin-yi Peng, Digitalization of Ser-
vices, the GATS and the Protection of Personal Data, in KOMMUIKATION: FESTSCHRIFT FU¨R
ROLF H. WEBER ZUM 60. GEBURTSTAG [COMMUNICATIONS: LIBER AMICORUM FOR PROF. DR.
ROLF H. WEBER] 753, 753– 69 (Reto M Hilty et al. eds., 2011). See also Rolf Weber, Regu-
latory Autonomy and Privacy Standards Under the GATS, 7 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH
L. AND POL’Y, 25, 26– 47 (2012).
17. U.S. Dep’t of COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE & DIG. ECON. LEADERSHIP
TEAM, FOSTERING THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 4 (2017), available at
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iot_green_paper_01122017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6H4C-T3LK].
18. IoT refers to “a distributed network connecting physical objects that are capable
of sensing or acting on their environment and able to communicate with each other,
other machines or computers.” RON DAVIES, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV.,
THE INTERNET OF THINGS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 1– 2 (2015). The IoT should be
seen as the aggregation of many machine to machine (M2M) connections which focuses
on the “sharing of data” and processing that takes place between these devices. See id.;
see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (FTC), CAREFUL CONNECTIONS: BUILDING SECURITY IN
THE INTERNET OF THINGS (2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/careful-connections-building-security-internet-things [https://per
ma.cc/3PEM-9UJ8].
19. See DAVIES, supra note 18, at 4.
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standards, it will be difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) to enter the market.  That said, the central issue here is whether the
regulation of cybersecurity standards should follow a so-called “multis-
takeholder” approach, which, as discussed in this Article, has been champi-
oned over the years in the arena of Internet governance, or move towards a
more multilateral approach in which states play central roles.  Debates
regarding Internet governance have long embodied a tension between posi-
tions advocating for greater government oversight of the Internet and those
advocating for a coordinated structure spanning government, the private
sector, and civil society.20  Indeed, we are at a crossroads in global govern-
ance.21  The ongoing shift from multilateralism to multistakeholderism
raises pivotal issues concerning cybersecurity norm development,
namely— what is the appropriate role of the government in regulating the
Internet?  Is the multistakeholder approach effective and efficient in terms
of norm creation and harmonization?  Can existing informal cyberspace
norms meet the goal as well as traditional, legally binding regulation?  At a
more fundamental level, why is the shift to multistakeholder governance
happening?  This Article will engage in arguments regarding questions
about how to save the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) from the risk of
irrelevance in the context of cyberspace governance, as well as how private
cybersecurity standards can be regulated by the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (the “TBT Agreement”).
I. The Standards Jungle of Cybersecurity
A. The Top-Down Approach: A Government-Centered Cybersecurity
Standardization System
The implications of “standards” are different in various contexts.22
There is a strong relationship between national technical standards and an
efficient international trading system.  In a globalized world, standards pro-
20. See CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION AND THE ROYAL INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS,
WHO RUNS THE INTERNET? THE GLOBAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER MODEL OF INTERNET GOVERN-
ANCE 19– 44 (2016); Joost Pauwelyn, Rule-Based Trade 2.0? The Rise of Informal Rules and
International Standards and How They May Outcompete WTO Treaties, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L.
739, 745 (2014); see generally Urs Gasser et al., Multistakeholder as Governance Groups:
Observations from Case Studies (The Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y at Harv., Res.
Publication No. 2015-1 (2015)); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up: A Comparison of
“Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 217, 257 (2016); Shin-yi
Peng, The Soft Law Approach to Regulatory Harmonization: Are We Trading away Privacy
for Economic Integration? in A LIBER AMICORUM: MITSUO MATSUSHITA, A CRITICAL ASSESS-
MENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND GOVERNANCE 328, 335 (Julien Chaisse et
al. eds., 2016); Alessandra Arcuri, The TBT Agreement and Private Standards, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 485, 487 (Tracey Epps et al.
eds., 2013).
21. See Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert Wolfe, Private Standards and the WTO: Reclu-
sive No More, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 1, 2– 3 (2017).
22. See Shin-yi Peng, Standards as a Means to Technological Leadership? China’s ICT
Standards in the Context of the International Economic Order, in CHINA IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: NEW DIRECTIONS AND CHANGING PARADIGMS 128 (Lisa Toohey et
al. eds., 2015).
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vide information about products to consumers in the importing country to
ensure technical compatibility.23  By sharing a common standard, anony-
mous manufacturers in markets all over the world can communicate, estab-
lish common expectations of one another’s products, and evaluate the
compatibility of their joint productions.24  That said, cybersecurity stan-
dards can have a strong influence over “trade flow,” as they affect the
demand and supply of ICT goods and services.25
In this context, perhaps China’s top-down, government-centered
standardization system represents the most outstanding case.  In the Chi-
nese ICT market, the government assumes primary responsibility in stand-
ardization development, with the policy rationale that state-led
standardization creates the most efficient national economy.26
China’s Wireless LAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure
(“WAPI”) Standard, which was developed under a typical top-down govern-
ment-central standardization system, demonstrates how cybersecurity
standards might create effective trade barriers.  The Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) 802.11 Wi-Fi standard became the for-
mal international standard of the International Organization for Standardi-
zation (“ISO”).  However, the Chinese government decided to use a
different “security” protocol, i.e., WAPI, for mandatory compliance.27
Under the mandated Chinese approach, equipment vendors who sell
WLAN devices in China must offer products based on the Chinese stan-
dard.  China’s approach to using technical regulations and standards in the
ICT sector, which in many instances appears to have been designed to favor
China-specific approaches, has caused substantial concerns.  Industry
associations have consistently encouraged the Chinese government to har-
monize its standards regime with internationally recognized market-driven
standards instead of creating its own.28
The question as to whether the regulations China has developed in the
cybersecurity area are consistent with WTO obligations remains unan-
swered.29  Consequently, the Chinese ICT standards create a systematic
increase in uncertainty and negatively impacts international trade.  Earlier
this year, more than 50 business groups from all over the world urged
23. Id. at 129; see also Xiaomeng Lu, Standards-Related Barriers to Trade in Chinese
ICT Market (MONTEREY INST. OF INT’L STUDIES, Capstone Project Prepared for the MAITP
Degree 7 (2008)).
24. Id.
25. Peng, supra note 22, at 144.
26. See DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW
COMM’N, THE RISE OF CHINA IN TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS: NEW NORMS IN OLD INSTITUTIONS
2 (2016).
27. See Christopher S. Gibson, Globalization and the Technology Standards Game: Bal-
ancing Concerns of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International Standards, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1403, 1435 (2007).
28. See DIETER ERNST, UC INST. ON GLOB. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION AND THE EAST-
WEST CTR., INDIGENOUS INNOVATION AND GLOBALIZATION: THE CHALLENGE FOR CHINA’S
STANDARDIZATION STRATEGY 67 (2011).
29. See Peng, supra note 22, at 145. R
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China to delay the enforcement of its new cybersecurity law,30 which was
slated to take effect on June 1, 2017.  The group stressed that the new
cybersecurity law, especially those measures that require the use of secure
and controllable technologies in the ICT sector, as well as future implemen-
tation standards, will effectively erect trade barriers and thus “adversely
impact billions of dollars in cross-border trade.”31  The recent “trade war
under the guise of cybersecurity” raises the question of how top-down
approaches to standardization can better ensure China’s cybersecurity
without sacrificing the benefits of global trade.32
B. The Bottom-Up Approach: Multistakeholder Platforms for
Cybersecurity Standardization
There exists a spectrum of cybersecurity standardization models,
ranging from more centralized governmental involvement, such as in the
case of China, to more decentralized private initiatives.  The reality is that a
“traditional” top-down regulatory approach now struggles to keep pace
with the innovation on the Internet.  There is a growing trend across the
world toward a bottom-up approach to cybersecurity standardization.33
Empirical studies demonstrate that more and more jurisdictions have been
settling on a bottom-up approach to cybersecurity policymaking, which
aims to minimize mandatory governmental regulation and to favor a volun-
tary, private-sector standard to enhance cybersecurity.34  Under the bot-
tom-up approach, the business sector has actively taken on the
standardization initiative, which they contend leads to more cost-effective
rules than government regulation.35  This privatization of governance is
driven, in part, by governments’ lack of requisite technical expertise and
the flexibility to deal with ever-more complex regulatory tasks.36  The
30. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Global Business Groups Urge Beijing to Delay Cybersecurity
Law, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 15, 2017), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
article/2094450/global-business-groups-urge-beijing-delay-cybersecurity-law [https://
perma.cc/9BMF-QUT3]; see also Letter from ACT: The App Association, et al., to Chi-
nese Communist Party Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs (May 15, 2017)
(on file with author); Rick Weber, U.S. Commission Echoes Industry Concerns About Broad
Scope of China’s New Cybersecurity Law, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY (Aug. 22, 2017), https://
insidecybersecurity.com/daily-news/us-commission-echoes-industry-concerns-about-
broad-scope-chinas-new-cybersecurity-law [https://perma.cc/L92L-3MBE].
31. Michael Martina & Cate Cadell, Amid Industry Pushback, China Offers Changes
to Cyber Rules: Sources, REUTERS (May 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-cyber-law/amid-industry-pushback-china-offers-changes-to-cyber-rules-sources-
idUSKCN18F1VZ [https://perma.cc/EZ7J-BQ77].  The group also underscored the
asymmetry between the access that foreign countries are granted to China’s ICT market
and the access Chinese companies enjoy in other markets.
32. WORLD TRADE ONLINE, Cybersecurity Claims Mask Ongoing U.S.-China ‘Trade
War’ over Tech Products, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 13, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/
trade/cato-paper-cybersecurity-claims-mask-ongoing-us-china-trade-war-over-tech-prod-
ucts [https://perma.cc/73DF-QLTN].
33. Shackelford, supra note 20, at 259. R
34. Id.
35. TIM BUTHE ET AL., THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN
THE WORLD ECONOMY 5 (2011).
36. Id.
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involvement of public and private sector actors working together has
proven to be a more effective model than complete government control.
Emblematic of this movement in the context of the European Union is
the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(“ENISA”).37  Since its founding in 2004, ENISA has actively contributed to
cybersecurity standards and thus to proper functioning of the internal mar-
ket within the Union.38  By working closely together with the EU member
states and the private sector, ENISA provides advice and solutions related
to cybersecurity, supports policy implementation, and coordinates stand-
ardization activities.39  As ENISA repeatedly stresses in its policy papers, it
believes enhancing the role of public-private partnerships should be
emphasized in standardization processes.40  A bottom-up approach to the
creation of cybersecurity standards and strong representation from stake-
holders are the key elements in ENISA decision-making procedures.41
On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. National Institute for Stan-
dards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (the “NIST Framework”)
represents another striking example of a bottom-up approach to cyber-
security standardization.  The NIST, now a part of the U.S. Department of
Commerce, is one of the nation’s oldest physical science laboratories.42  To
respond to Executive Order 13636, issued in February of 2013, the NIST
utilized a year-long consultative process with stakeholders to create the
NIST Framework— a set of industry standards and best practices to help
organizations manage cybersecurity risks.43  In a series of multi-stake-
holder meetings, hundreds of international representatives from govern-
37. See generally EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY,
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/ [https://perma.cc/4HVU-H92T] (last visited Aug. 12,
2018) (ENISA is a center of expertise for cyber security in Europe).
38. See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY, About
ENISA, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa [https://perma.cc/4XP7-P4YZ] (last
visited Aug. 12, 2018).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id.; see also EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECUR-
ITY, GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN STANDARDISATION 19 (2015) (stating that
“Cybersecurity standards should be created based on the needs of stakeholders. Appro-
priate entities should collect the relevant information on the need of standardization
activities through public consultations with the industry, research and supervisory
bodies.”).
42. US DEP’T OF COMMERCE, About NIST, https://www.nist.gov/about-nist [https://
perma.cc/CPJ7-ZUYU] (last visited Aug 12, 2018).
43. US DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Cybersecurity Framework, https://www.nist.gov/cyber-
framework [https://perma.cc/N3BK-W84T] (last visited Aug. 12, 2018).  The Frame-
work consists of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Profile, and the
Framework Implementation Tiers. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK
FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 1  (2014), available at https://
www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCN4-W5Y3] (providing contextual background on the
Executive Order and the Cybersecurity Framework); see also Lei Shen, The NIST Cyber-
security Framework: Overview and Potential Impacts, 10 TECH. LAWYER 16, 17 (2014);
Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring the
Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable National
and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 305 (2015).
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ment, business, and civil society came together to create the NIST
Framework.44  Such a process demonstrates an active dialogue that relies
on a bottom-up approach to cybersecurity regulation— building consensus
across sectors and industries through a dynamic public-private partner-
ship.45  The NIST has continued to engage with stakeholders through mul-
tiple avenues of communication.  Although now playing an active and
central role in implementing the Trump administration’s cybersecurity
agenda,46 the 2017 NIST Framework reaffirms its commitment to private
sector self-governance.47  Arguably, the international community needs
some degree of governmental involvement in implementing standards to
properly evaluate businesses’ efforts, to incentivize private sector self-gov-
ernance, and to reward stakeholders that meet those standards.  Such a
two-fold approach to public-private co-governance represents a compro-
mise between top-down regulatory interference and outright self-
governance.48
Of course, the idea of governance through public-private networks is
not new at all.  Researchers, including those in international economy law,
have long researched the changing role of the state in market economies
and the transformation of public functions.  Professor Shaffer, in his book,
elaborates on how public hierarchies and private markets complement one
another.49  As Shaffer indicates, these networks bring together public and
private actors to address policy issues.50  In a world of increasing complex-
ity, governments are delegating traditionally public functions to the private
sector.  Therefore, the world is increasingly governed through co-regulation
by public and private actors.51  In the context of cybersecurity, where pub-
lic and private sectors attempt to adapt to rapid technological changes, it is
particularly evident that governments must relax the regulatory power and
shift responsibility through privatization.
However, procedure and substance are often closely intertwined, as
well as mutually defining.  Due to the bottom-up approaches, cybersecurity
standards are proliferating.52  A growing number of organizations are
becoming involved in standards development, as more and more manufac-
turers and vendors build and sell standards-compliant products and ser-
44. Shackelford, supra note 20, at 222. R
45. Id.
46. Rick Weber, NIST Emerges as Key Player in Implementing Trump’s Cybersecurity
Agenda, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY (July 3, 2017), https://insidecybersecurity.com/daily-
news/nist-emerges-key-player-implementing-trumps-cybersecurity-agenda [https://
perma.cc/X3SP-SA9F].
47. See generally US DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK WORKSHOP
2017 SUMMARY (2017), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/07/
21/cybersecurity_framework_workshop_2017_summary_20170721_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W66M-5AMA].
48. See generally US DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 42.
49. GREGORY SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO
LITIGATION 12– 14 (2003).
50. Id. at 12– 13.
51. Shackelford, supra note 20, at 219.
52. SCARFONE ET AL., supra note 14 at 1.
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vices.53  To date, the number of cybersecurity standards, in some form,
exceeds 1,000 publications globally,54 resulting in a complex standards
landscape.  This “mushrooms after rain” phenomenon of private cyber-
security standards may lead to potential problems.  Although, on the one
hand it manifests the dynamics of the industry, it might also result in the
danger of overlapping work.  From the perspective of international trade,
such diversity makes compliance challenging and therefore directs
resources away from more effective mechanisms.55  The international
“standards jungle” of cybersecurity, as a result, may in fact work as an
impediment to free trade.
II. Harmonization of Cybersecurity Standards
“[Differences in] standards matter little when markets are predomi-
nantly domestic.”56  As shown in <Figure 1>, from the aspects of the top-
down standardization approach, centralization may solve the problems of
duplication and fragmentation.  The advantage of a centralized, non-mar-
ket, public standard-setting regime (Type I) is that the government can sim-
ply mandate the adoption of non-competing cybersecurity standards as de
jure technical regulations within the appropriate jurisdiction when the pub-
lic sector plays a major role in the standard-setting process.57  When a gov-
ernment adopts de jure, mandatory cybersecurity standards,58 it can
effectively prevent standards wars within the specific jurisdiction.
The integration of ICT markets, however, has greatly increased interde-
pendence and has thus created incentives to coordinate on common techni-
cal solutions.59  By standardizing different, but otherwise incompatible
products, “international standards” have contributed to the enhancement
of economic globalization.60  Standards provide information about prod-
ucts to consumers in the importing country to ensure technical compatibil-
ity.61  By sharing a common standard, anonymous manufacturers in
markets all over the world can benefit from common expectations of one
another’s products.  The use of standards reduces uncertainty, because any
innovator in the market can develop new applications with the guarantee
53. Id.
54. PWC & DEP’T. FOR BIS, supra note 8, at 4.
55. See Paula Bruening, Interoperability: Analyzing the Current Trends & Develop-
ments, DATA PROTECTION LEADER, available at http://www.cecileparkmedia.com/data-
protection-leader/article_template.asp?Contents=yes&from=dplp&ID=978 [https://
perma.cc/9X7Y-SQQC] (last visited Aug. 12, 2018).
56. BUTHE ET AL., supra note 35, at 5– 6. R
57. See also Branislav Hazucha, Technical Barriers to Trade in Information and Com-
munication Technologies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS
TO TRADE 525, 543 (Tracey Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013).
58. BUTHE ET AL., supra note 35, at 137.
59. Id. at 6.
60. SCARFONE ET AL., supra note 14, at 1.
61. Id.
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that an international market for their products will exist.62
At the core of the matter lies this question— how can cybersecurity
standards be globally governed?  Further, how can a less fragmented and
more harmonized cybersecurity regime be established, which would con-
tribute greatly to global economic growth?63  This chapter will distinguish
between the four types of cybersecurity standardization,64 based on
whether the standards are developed in public or private settings (the verti-
cal axis in Figure 1) and whether the standards are created through market
competition (the horizontal axis in Figure 1).  Placing the “top-down” and
“bottom-up” approaches in such a context allows us to identify the features
of different types of cybersecurity standard-setting and to recognize the
challenges for international economic order.
Figure 1
Harmonization of Cybersecurity Standards: Institutional Setting
and Harmonization Mechanism
Public
Top-Down
Nonmarket
-Based
Market
-Based
Bottom-Up
Private
Cyberspace Governance
Multistakeholderism
Public-Private Partnership
e.g., NIST Cybersecurity
Framework
National/Regional
Competing Standards
e.g., Singapore – MTCS/SS
Focal Standard-Setting Body
e.g., ISO
27001 Cybersecurity Standards
Type III
Type II
Type IV
De Jure Security Standards
e.g., China -WAPI
Type I
(Source: Author’s analysis and composition)65
62. Id.; Baisheng An, Institutional Governance for ICT Standards at the International
level: Within the WTO and Beyond (unpublished paper based on World Trade Organiza-
tion thesis (Oct. 2008– Sept. 2009)) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
63. See Peng, supra note 20, at 328, 333– 35.
64. Buthe & Mattli created a “typology to distinguish modes of global regulation.”
The types of standards in this are also based on public/private and market/nonmarket-
based regulation. See BUTHE ET AL., supra note 35, at 19, 33. See also Walter Mattli, R
Beyond the State? Are Transnational Regulatory Institutions Replacing the State? in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE STATE 285, 289– 97 (Stephan Leibfried et
al. eds., 2015).
65. See id.  This figure is based off the work of Buthe and Mattli.
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A. The “Traditional” Mechanism: A Possible Blind Alley
As shown in <Figure 1>, the ISO standards are established in private
international institutions, and this process does not entail market competi-
tion (Type II).66  These types of standards once played a prominent role in
standards harmonization across jurisdictions.  Governments have long
committed to using the ISO standards as the technical basis for domestic
regulation,67 through either ex post endorsement or ex ante delegation of
public regulatory authority.  In most cases, the legislators or regulators
“borrow” ISO standards to incorporate into domestic regulations.  At other
times, domestic laws simply include a general reference to the specific ISO
standard, with the mandate that the regulatory obligation will be automati-
cally transferred to the revised standard if such a standard subsequently
changes.68
The ISO 27001 on cybersecurity, however, has a relatively low adop-
tion rate worldwide.69  In the past, standards of the communications sector
have been governed by the so-called big three: the ISO, the International
Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”), and International Telecommunica-
tions Union (“ITU”).  Today, these traditional organizations are comple-
mented and at times replaced by multiple industry-centered consortia.70
The ICT business consortia are reportedly producing cybersecurity stan-
dards in a manner that has meant even the ISO 27001 has been challenged,
if not outpaced, by new informal standard setters.71  An empirical analysis
has demonstrated that the ISO 27001 standard, when compared to the
other ISO standards, has received significantly less interest from the indus-
try as measured by the rate of adoption.72  The low adoption rate of the
ISO cybersecurity standards, in my view, is primarily attributable to the
three following reasons.
First, compared with the emerging market-driven, bottom-up
approaches, the ISO requires a relatively long time to develop international
consensus on positions.  An ISO standard generally takes several years
from inception to publication in order to meet the consensus procedural
requirement, which— among other elements— includes the use of the ISO
66. Id. at 19.
67. See Arcuri, supra note 20, at 494.  ISO has observer status in the TBT Commit- R
tee.  Reference to the ISO is found in the TBT Agreement.  However, whether ISO stan-
dards are international standards within the meaning of the TBT Agreement remains
disputed.
68. Id.
69. The ISO/IEC 27000 is the best-known standard providing requirements for an
information security management system (ISMS), which is a systematic approach to
managing sensitive company information so that it remains secure and helps organiza-
tions keep information assets secure. See ISO, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STAND-
ARDIZATION, available at https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html
[https://perma.cc/578Q-KE4Q] (last visited Aug. 12, 2018).
70. Pauwelyn, supra note 20, at 743. R
71. Id.
72. Vladislav V. Fomin et al., ISO/IEC 27001 Information Systems Security Manage-
ment Standard: Exploring the Reasons for Low Adoption, EUROMOT 2008— THE THIRD
EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY (2008).
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five-step process involving multiple draft reviews, comments from national
bodies, an international ballot, and the vote of each national body.73  Con-
sidering the nature of cybersecurity, in which public and private sectors
attempt to adapt to rapid technological changes, the ISO may fail to address
and manage cybersecurity risk in a cost-effective way based on business
needs.
In addition, the legitimacy and accountability issues of the ISO have
further weakened its function in developing cybersecurity standards.74
Unlike other standards areas, cybersecurity standards are by nature socio-
technical in the sense that such standards have both human/social and
technological elements that are strictly intertwined.75  Cybersecurity
standardization is therefore far more complex than a purely technical,
classical standardization approach.76  In the domain of cybersecurity,
“multistakeholderism” requires a multi-disciplinary approach that appears
difficult to achieve under the ISO regime, which has been labeled a club
dominated by certain industrial groups in which civil societies are
excluded from decision-making procedures.77
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the ISO is not operation-
ally self-sufficient, and its officials do not work in isolation.78  Domestic
standards bodies are an important component of the ISO institutional
structure, and they seek to promote and defend the regulatory preferences
of their stakeholders to minimize domestic switching costs.79  In other
words, standards should not be seen as norms which embody some objec-
tive truth or undisputed scientific wisdom— neither is the ISO process
apolitical.80
With respect to <Figure 1>, it should also be noted that similar logic
can be applied to market-based public standards (Type III, Figure 1).81
73. INT’L CYBERSECURITY STANDARDIZATION WORKING GRP. OF THE NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL’S
CYBER INTERAGENCY POLICY COMM., SUPPLEMENTAL INFO. FOR THE INTERAGENCY REPORT ON
STRATEGIC U.S GOV’T ENGAGEMENT IN INT’L STANDARDIZATION TO ACHIEVE U.S. OBJECTIVES
FOR CYBERSECURITY, available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.IR
.8074v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BD9-CKVR].
74. Arcuri, supra note 20, at 495.  The ISO has been labeled a club dominated by R
private industrial groups where developing countries and civil societies are excluded
from information and decision-making procedure.  The privileged status of ISO raised
the controversy on its legitimacy and accountability.
75. See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY, supra
note 37. R
76. See id.
77. See Arcuri, supra note 20, at 495. R
78. See BUTHE ET AL., supra note 35, at 12. R
79. Id.  See also Hazucha, supra note 57, at 533.  The losing companies have to bear
the cost of developing technical solutions which were not successful in the competition
with the adopted standard.
80. See BUTHE ET AL., supra note 35, at 12. R
81. For example, the Multi-Tier Cloud Security Standard for Singapore (MTCS SS)
issued by the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (IDA), which aims to pro-
vide businesses with greater clarity on the levels of security offered by different cloud
service providers (CSPs), is the world’s first cloud security standard. See Singapore
Launches Multi-Tier Cloud Security Standard, INFOCOMM MEDIA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.imda.gov.sg/infocomm-and-media-news/whats-trending/
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Given that the political and economic stakes in cybersecurity standard-set-
ting can be enormous, it is difficult, if not impossible, for national or
regional standards to win out over other standards as the global standard
after a period of public rule-making competition among public regula-
tors.82  To conclude, cybersecurity standard-setting is not merely about
who commercially wins and who loses.  It is also politically sensitive and
complex.  Reasons, such as conflicting political agendas, national security
concerns, and competition for global influence, have created a rather diffi-
cult situation in the arena of cybersecurity standards harmonization.83
B. Market-Based “Private” Standard-Setting: The Organically Evolving
Norms
1. Cyberspace Governance and Multistakeholderism
As advocated by the ICT industry and relevant civil societies, govern-
ments are important components of Internet governance, but they do not
play an exclusively dominant role.  Through a relatively inclusive and trans-
parent process,84 “polycentric partnerships”— from the private sector to
civil society to technical experts to governments— represent the constitu-
ency of a truly global governance sphere.85  In other words, governments,
working together with other relevant stakeholders, participate on equal
footing as representatives of their respective constituents.86  Therefore, this
represents a new approach to cybersecurity that seeks out best practices
from the public and private sectors by fostering multistakeholder
collaboration.87
Is it possible to produce bottom-up, market-based outcomes for cyber-
security (Type IV, Figure 1) in a global environment?  Indeed, it was this
bottom-up “private” mechanism that gave the Internet its momentum and
2013/12/singapore-launches-multitier-cloud-security-standard [https://perma.cc/
NNQ7-A2SA] (last visited Aug. 12, 2018).
82. See BUTHE ET AL., supra note 35, at 9. R
83. See Shackelford et al., supra note 20, at 255. R
84. Pauwelyn, supra note 20, at 739, 748– 51. R
85. The Internet Governance Forum (IGF), as an example, was formed due to the
growing unease with US control over ICANN.  Since its inception, IGF seeks to bring
together a variety of representatives from academia, civil society, private sector groups,
and governments to discuss and shape Internet governance policy. See Vinton G. Cerf et
al., IoT Safety and Security as Shared Responsibility, 1(35) BUSINESS INFORMATICS 7, 13
(2016).
86. Id.
87. The term “multistakeholderism” refers to “two or more classes of actors engaged
in a common governance enterprise concerning issues they regard as public in nature.”
Mark Raymond & Laura Denardis, Multistakeholderism: anatomy of an inchoate global
institution, 7:3 INT’L THEORY 572, 573 (2015).  In practice, there are various types of
multistakeholder governance, produced by variation on the types of actors involved and
the nature of authority. See generally William H. Dutton, Multistakeholder Internet Gov-
ernance?, in BACKGROUND PAPER: DIGITAL DIVIDENDS 2– 5 (2016); Kal Raustiala, Governing
the Internet (UCLA Sch. L. Pub. L & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Res. Paper No.
16– 33 (2016)); STEFAAN G. VERHULST, THE PRACTICE AND CRAFT OF MULTISTAKEHOLDER
GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF GLOBAL INTERNET POLICYMAKING 8– 9 (2016); Shackelford et al.,
supra note 20, at 245; CIGI, supra note 20, at 2. R
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enabled the phenomenal level of innovation that has characterized the
Internet.88  How, then, could such highly flexible, decentralized and
polycentric governance arrangements— involving many different institu-
tions and individuals— help to harmonize cybersecurity standards?  Exam-
ining the history of “traditional standards wars,” it is clear that one firm’s
proprietary solution may become the global de facto technical standard if
that firm attains a dominant position in the market.89  In other words,
market competition between competing private standards can be an effec-
tive means of moving toward de facto standardization.90  Could any Type
IV standard-setting entity succeed in establishing its technology as the mar-
ket-dominant de facto international standard as a result of widespread
acceptance in the market?  Would such a market-based, public-private
international standard-setting mechanism occur in the context of
cybersecurity?91
2. Emerging Norms and the Direction of Evolution
Again, taking the NIST Framework as an example, although “volun-
tary,” the framework is nonetheless highly influential.  Industry is increas-
ingly referencing the framework as a de facto cybersecurity standard.92
According to a relevant survey, the framework is now used by approxi-
mately 30 percent of U.S. organizations, and this estimate is projected to
reach 50 percent by 2020.93  In fact, the framework has already been influ-
ential not only in the U.S., but also in other jurisdictions.94  Such harmoni-
zation is a critical first step toward cyberspace norm development that
could, in time, lead to international cybersecurity standards.95
As previously discussed, since its creation, the framework serves as a
common set of terms and language for discussing cybersecurity within
industry and government, which over time helps to harmonize global
cybersecurity best practices and shape global standards.  Industry use of
the NIST Framework of cybersecurity standards is growing throughout
Canada, Latin America, Europe, and Asia.  In Japan, for example, the
framework and ISO 27001 are complementary tools,96 and a recent survey
revealed that 33 percent of participating organizations referred to the NIST
best practices as their cybersecurity standards.  It is acceptable to state that
88. See Dutton, supra note 87, at 33.
89. See BUTHE ET AL., supra note 35, at 14; Arcuri, supra note 20, at 521.  Examples of R
de facto standards include Microsoft Windows operating systems and Sony’s Blu-ray
format that won over Toshiba’s HD DVD to become a global standard for optical discs.
90. See BUTHE ET AL., supra note 35, at 14.
91. Id. at 25– 32.
92. See, e.g., AMAZON WEB SERVICE, NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK (CSF)— ALIGN-
ING TO THE NIST CSF IN THE AWS CLOUD 5 (2017).
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Shackelford et al., supra note 20, at 254. R
96. Charlie Mitchell, Japanese Industry Leader on Cyber: NIST Framework Increas-
ingly Embraced Overseas, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY (July 25, 2017), https://insidecybersecur
ity.com/daily-news/japanese-industry-leader-cyber-nist-framework-increasingly-embra
ced-overseas [https://perma.cc/Z4MX-7DCY].
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the framework has the potential to become a de facto international cyber-
security standard.97
As globalization has created markets that cross borders,98 there is an
increasing reliance on a diverse array of mechanisms to “harmonize” inter-
national affairs.99  An international arrangement that is designed as an
instrument of global governance can be placed on a continuum from “hard
law” to “soft law”100 to “informal rules.”101  As Joost defined it, informal
international lawmaking is unique, but it does incorporate the phenome-
non of soft law, as it addresses not only informal output but also new infor-
mal actors and processes.102  Multistakeholderism in cyberspace
governance, which features both non-traditional actors/processes and non-
traditional outputs, demonstrates the increasingly diverse and creative
forms of cooperation outside of international law.  This ongoing shift to
multistakeholder governance, however, raises a host of important ques-
tions.  How can the WTO be saved from the risk of irrelevance?  How can
the WTO become a forum for trade disputes concerning “private” cyber-
security standards created through a multistakeholder process?  How can
governments be held accountable for Type IV regulatory regimes that
impose unjustified barriers to trade?  The central question, however, is as
follows: is the TBT Agreement still relevant?
III. Implications for WTO Law
A. Technical Regulation: Saving the TBT Agreement from Declining
Relevance
The last decade has witnessed rapidly growing interest among schol-
ars from different disciplines in cyberspace governance and multis-
takeholderism, which have emerged around the regulation of the Internet.
Surprisingly, though, the impact of such phenomenon on the WTO is a
topic that has received relatively little attention in the literature.  At the
crux of the matter is this: the emerging norms in cyberspace have
prompted concerns that the WTO is becoming irrelevant.103  The prolifera-
tion of private regulation could destroy the enormous benefits we derive
from the multilateral trading system.  The multistakeholder mechanism in
cyberspace governance is widely feared to spell the end of the WTO’s mul-
97. See Shackelford et al., supra note 20, at 254. R
98. See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 735, 745 (2014).
99. Id.
100. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANAL-
YSIS 171, 173 (2010). See also Gunther F. Handl et al., A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 371, 371 (1988). See also Jonathan Carlson, Hunger, Agricultural
Trade Liberalization, and Soft Law: Addressing the Legal Dimensions of a Political Problem,
70 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1200– 01 (1985).
101. See Pauwelyn, supra note 20, at 742; Carlson, supra note 100, at 1203.
102. See Pauwelyn, supra note 20, at 742.
103. See, e.g., Shawn Donnan, WTO Wrestles with Relevance in Age of Ecommerce, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d9f63c20-e01d-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a
52f9c [https://perma.cc/6PNB-GGAP].
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tinational approach, with the WTO gradually moving toward the status of a
marginalized talking shop.104
This Article argues that eventually the WTO panels and the Appellate
Body (AB) might have to engage in judicial interpretation of private norms
governing cyberspace— in particular, the interpretation of the inevitable
clashes between multilateralism and multistakeholderism.  In such poten-
tial litigation, the complaining party would undoubtedly argue that the
measures at issue, i.e., market-based “voluntary” cybersecurity standards
developed from “public-private partnership” processes (Type IV, Figure 1),
fall under the definition of “technical regulation” in the TBT Agreement.105
Would such claims regarding the TBT Agreement prevail?  Could the panel
of the AB strike down an invocation of TBT Article 2.1 given that the “mea-
sures,” e.g., the Type IV standards, are not mandatory and therefore are not
a “technical regulation” under TBT Article 2.1?  It is vital that the com-
plaining members develop arguments to establish that there is sufficient
“governmental involvement” under such a public-private “co-govern-
ance.”106  The responding party, on the other hand, may argue that the
standards issued by such “transparent and inclusive” processes constitute
“relevant international standards” within the meaning of TBT Article
2.4.107
In short, on the issue of the Type IV cybersecurity standards, the chal-
lenges facing the TBT Agreement today are numerous.  This section exam-
ines four challenges in particular: a challenge to the definition of “technical
regulation,”108 a challenge to the determination of “government action,” a
challenge to the distinction of “voluntary/mandatory” compliance,109 and
a challenge to the recognition of the “international standardization bodies”
for cybersecurity.110  The fact that a certain Type IV regulation has the
104. See Theodore H. Cohn, The World Trade Organization and Global Governance, in
NEO-LIBERALISM, STATE POWER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 201, 213 (Simon Lee & Stephen
McBride eds., 2007).
105. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120,
135 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
106. See ARKADY KUDRYAVTSEV, PRIVATE-SECTOR STANDARDS AS TECHNICAL BAKERIES IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS: IN SEARCH OF WTO DISCIPLINES 159– 74 (2005).
107. See TBT Agreement, supra note 105, at 121.
108. See id. (“Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in
any other country.”)
109. See id. at 135.  For the purpose of the TBT Agreement, the following definitions
shall apply: “1. Technical regulation— Document which lays down product characteris-
tics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable admin-
istrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory.” Id. (emphasis added).  “It
may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or
labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.” Id.
110. See id. at 121 (“Where technical regulations are required and relevant interna-
tional standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the
relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when such inter-
national standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for
the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental
climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.”).
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potential to become a de facto cybersecurity international standard has cre-
ated a renewed sense of urgency for the WTO to take action in order to
avoid the fate of being eclipsed into irrelevance in the domain of cyber-
space governance.  Can the TBT Agreement save the WTO from declining
significance in its global governance of the Internet?
B. Government Action: Public, Private, and In-Between
Type IV cybersecurity standardization activities generate many inter-
pretive issues.  At the heart of the controversy is the determination of a
“government act.”  In situations where the adoption, preparation, and
application of cybersecurity policy or regulatory schemes are delegated by
the government to a private standard entity, or where the “private” stan-
dards are incorporated into law— no matter ex ante delegation or ex post
incorporation111— it is uncontestable that the “private actions” may fall
within the scope of the TBT agreement, as a “government endorsement”
can be found.112  However, as stressed earlier, the “public-private partner-
ship” in many cybersecurity standardization processes, during which pub-
lic and private sector actors work together, may fall neither into the public
nor the private domain but, rather, “in-between.”113
The issue of “attribution” of private actions to WTO Members has
arisen before the WTO dispute settlement system and was considered by
WTO panels and AB in several disputes— in particular, under the rules of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”), and the Agreement on
Agriculture (“AoA”).114  Considering the approaches taken by the WTO
panels and the AB, a Type IV cybersecurity standard may constitute a tech-
nical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement if the support
provided by a government is sufficient to become a governmental act.  In
past WTO jurisprudence, private actions could be attributed to govern-
ments if there was sufficient governmental involvement.115  In the
US– Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review case, the AB stressed that, in
principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member can be a
measure of that Member for the purposes of dispute settlement proceed-
111. Arcuri, supra note 20, at 497. R
112. Id. See also KUDRYAVTSEV, supra note 106, at 238– 39.
113. See Kristin E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467,
470– 71 (2017).
114. See KUDRYAVTSEV, supra note 106, at 159– 74.  See also Panel Reports, European
Communities and Its Member States— Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology
Products, ¶ 7.1167, WTO Doc. WT/DS375/R/WT/DS376/R/WT/DS377/R, (adopted
Aug. 6, 2010).
115. See KUDRYAVTSEV, supra note 106, at 159; Arcuri, supra note 20, at 498.  As R
Kudryavtsev elaborated in the book, there have been several cases regarding the issue of
“attribution” under the WTO jurisprudence, e.g., in the Japan-Semiconductors case.
Japan was found to be in violation of Article XI:I of the GATT as the “voluntary” private
export restrictions on the export of semiconductor were attributed to the Japanese
government.
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ings.116  In Japan– DRAMs (Korea), the panel stated that there must be a
demonstrable link between the government and the conduct of the private
body.117  Generally speaking, the degree of governmental involvement is
decisive for the qualification of a private action as a governmental respon-
sibility.  In other words, private conduct will come under the WTO disci-
plines only if it can be attributed to a WTO member.118
It should be noted, however, that in Japan– Film, the AB clarified that
neither every utterance by a government official nor every study prepared
by a non-governmental body at the request of the government or with some
degree of government support can be viewed as a measure by a Member
government.119  In other words, WTO panels and the AB do not easily
assume the responsibility of Members with regard to private conduct with-
out convincing evidence, and the burden of proof to establish that such a
nexus lies with the complainant.120  Although the relevant texts themselves
do not clarify which measures are to be regarded as those of WTO Mem-
bers, WTO jurisprudence, as stressed in U.S.– Gambling, clarifies that it
requires a sufficient “nexus” between government action and private con-
duct for the attribution of the latter to the former.121
This Article argues that most of the Type IV standards are controver-
sial in terms of whether such a scheme is delegated by public power.  The
blurring of public and private and the changing architecture of the state
make the identification of “the degree of governmental involvement” a
rather complex area.  Indeed, public-private schemes are emerging.  In the
real world, a carrot-and-stick balancing approach might be proven to be the
most effective way to promote cybersecurity.  Voluntary self-regulation and
direct government regulation are mutually exclusive options and fall on the
opposing ends of the regulatory spectrum.  However, the cybersecurity co-
regulatory model, in which public and private sector actors work together,
falls somewhere in the middle.  One key element of the changing character
of cybersecurity is the significance attached to the role of the third party,
especially the certification mechanism.  The NIST Framework, again serv-
ing as an example, demonstrates how a multistakeholder approach could
provide a foundation on which to build a certification system as a middle
ground between “purely public” and “purely private” cybersecurity certifi-
cation efforts.122
116. See Appellate Body Report, United States— Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties
on Corrosion Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, ¶¶ 81– 82, WTO Doc. WT/
DS244/AB/R (adopted Dec. 14, 2003).
117. See Panel Report, Japan— Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random-Access Memo-
ries from Korea, ¶ 7.104, WTO Doc. WT/DS336/R (adopted July 13, 2007).
118. See Mavroidis & Wolfe, supra note 21, at 10. R
119. See Panel Report, Japan— Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper paras. 10.43, 10.45– 51, WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R (adopted Apr. 22, 1998).
120. See KUDRYAVTSEV, supra note 106.
121. See Appellate Body Report, United States— Measures Affecting the Cross Border Sup-
ply of Gambling and Betting Services, paras. 121– 23, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R
(adopted Apr. 20, 2005).
122. See Shackelford et al., supra note 20, at 256. R
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The emergence of a multiplicity of new actors and different standard-
setting bodies therefore results in the question of how international trade
agreements will respond to increasing networking between public actors
and private participants.123  In the future, WTO panels and the AB might
have to face questions as to whether “co-regulation” falls within the scope
of the term “technical regulations” in TBT Article 2.1.  Can the concept of
“technical regulation” be broadly construed in order to cope with the trend
of the “privatization of regulation”?  Would such an interpretative approach
be overbroad and therefore potentially compromise the legal certainty and
predictability of the TBT Agreement?  Would such an interpretation create
the risk that Members will be subject to WTO dispute settlement proceed-
ings even when they did not effectively control or govern the actions of a
private body or delegate such responsibility to a private body?
In light of the potential for litigation, it is vital that the complaining
party develop arguments to establish that the cybersecurity standards at
issue, although arising from a multistakeholder process, involve acts dele-
gated by public powers.  There might be a strong argument that, after all,
the private sector does not have the powers to oblige third parties to adhere
to a certain scheme.124  To support this position, the complaining party
could draw attention to the fact that the co-regulation mechanism is fulfil-
ling an important role in the cyberspace ecosystem.  On the other hand,
responding parties might argue that the amount of governmental involve-
ment is decisive for the qualification of private conduct as a governmental
responsibility.  That said, Type IV standards will come under the WTO
disciplines only if they can be attributed to a WTO member.125  In this
regard, cybersecurity “co-regulation” has shifted the role of government in
such a way that it no longer retains general oversight authority to approve
and enforce standards.
C. Voluntary/Mandatory Dichotomy: Non-Binding but Compulsory?
The key distinction between technical regulations and standards is
that compliance is mandatory with the former and voluntary with the lat-
ter.126  Under this definition, a Type IV cybersecurity standard may be
found to constitute a “technical regulation” within the meaning of the TBT
Agreement if the support provided by a government is sufficient so as to
render the standard “mandatory de facto.”  In US– Tuna II,127 the Panel at
the outset considered the interpretation of the term “mandatory” in Annex
1.1., noted various dictionary definitions, and explained that “mandatory”
may encompass the legally binding and enforceable character of the instru-
123. See MARTIN LODGE, MANAGING REGULATION: REGULATORY ANALYSIS, POLITICS AND
POLICY MANAGING 143 (2012).
124. See KUDRYAVTSEV, supra note 106; Arcuri, supra note 20, at 498– 99. R
125. See Mavroidis & Wolfe, supra note 21, at 12. R
126. See TBT Agreement, supra note 105, Annex 1.
127. Panel Report, United States– Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, paras. 7.102– 06, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R, (adopted
Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter US-Tuna II Panel Report].
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ment and may also relate to its contents, prescribing or imposing a certain
behavior.128  The Panel also stressed that the expression “mandatory
requirement” should be used to mean only “a requirement made compul-
sory by law or regulation.”129  A responding party in this hypothetical dis-
pute may counter that the Type IV standards merely constitute “voluntary
measures” that are not covered by Annex 1.1.
If the responding party successfully claims that the measures at issue
are not technical regulations, it would create a large carve-out under the
TBT agreement.  At the core of the issue is whether compliance with the
Type IV standards is de facto mandatory, which would therefore render the
measures “technical regulations” under TBT Article 2.1.
In this context, the case of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (the
“FTC”) serves as an interesting example.  Since 2000, the FTC has estab-
lished standards for “cybersecurity due diligence” by bringing dozens of
enforcement actions under its general statutory authority— Section 5(a) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act— to address “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”130  The FTC has brought these actions
against companies whose cybersecurity practices it deemed inherently
“unfair,” essentially by failing to take appropriate action to assess security
risks.  In these cases, the FTC consistently establishes de facto cyber-
security standards with respect to “reasonable” cybersecurity practices.
The reasonableness approach taken by the FTC, however, relies on indus-
try experts to prove unfairness, which is fully compatible with the NIST
framework.131  To illustrate, certain Type IV cybersecurity standards are
heavily referred to, if not relied upon, by relevant regulators to the degree
that in the real-world compliance with such standards becomes a core
requirement for “duty of care.”  For example, in 2012, the FTC began pro-
ceedings to sue Wyndham Hotels & Resorts LLC, seeking injunctive and
other equitable relief for this organization’s “failure to maintain reasonable
and appropriate data security for consumers’ sensitive personal informa-
tion.”132  In this particular case, the defendants cited the NIST framework,
implying that the framework might represent the regulatory expectation
when the FTC brought its enforcement action against Wyndham.133
It is evident that the implementation of the NIST Cybersecurity Frame-
work is emerging as a de facto requirement for companies in terms of
“cybersecurity due diligence” or “reasonable cybersecurity measures.”  It is
undeniable that the issues the NIST Framework calls for companies to eval-
uate are the same issues the FTC has evaluated for years through its Section
128. See Peng, supra note 22, at 136. R
129. Id.; see also US-Tuna II Panel Report, supra note 127, para. 7.103.
130. Bruce Heiman et al., The FTC Has Already Set Cybersecurity Standards, LAW360
(Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/626447/the-ftc-has-already-set-cyber-
security-standards [https://perma.cc/48GN-MHCX].
131. See Vladimir J. Semendyai, Response, Due Process and the FTC’s Fair and Reason-
able Approach to Data Protection, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 51, 66 (2016).
132. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
133. Def. Mot. to Dismiss, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602
(D. N.J. 2014).
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5 enforcement when determining whether a company’s data security and
processes are reasonable.134
Indeed, the FTC’s longstanding Section 5 enforcement takes a similar
approach to the NIST Framework.135  For example, in the complaints
against HTC America, Inc., the FTC alleged that the company did not have
a process for receiving, addressing, or monitoring reports about security
vulnerabilities.136  The framework’s guidance has a similar goal: almost all
FTC determinations align with the framework’s guidance that companies
should consider having a method for receiving vulnerable information.137
The FTC matches its cybersecurity standards with those of the NIST Cyber-
security Framework by ensuring that the framework’s approach is “fully
consistent” with the FTC’s approach.138  To conclude, existing FTC actions
seem to provide a clear standard of care.139  The consistency between the
FTC’s enforcement and the NIST Framework should signal to companies
that the FTC strongly endorses, if not requires, the NIST Framework in the
development, supplementation, and maintenance of a data security system.
Through long-term practices, the FTC has linked its “reasonableness stan-
dard for cybersecurity” to the “voluntary” NIST Framework.
In addition to regulators, judges also frequently resort to Type IV stan-
dards to give meaning to concepts in law, specifically when evaluating duty
of care in negligence cases.140  If a company’s cybersecurity practice is ever
questioned during litigation or a regulatory investigation, the “standard”
for “due diligence,” is highly likely to be the NIST Cybersecurity Frame-
work.141  Such judicial recognition can extend a binding effect to what are
otherwise “voluntary” private standards.142  Of course, the court does not
apply Type IV standards as such.  Instead, Type IV standards serve as
guidelines when it comes to the determination of the required standard of
care.  Compliance with those standards may not be a sufficient defense,
but it does have evidentiary value.143  The role of Type IV standards is,
134. NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework is consistent with the process-based approach
that the FTC has followed.  Put it in another way, FTC has mapped its cybersecurity
requirements to NIST Framework. See Andrea Arias, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework
and the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
blogs/business-blog/2016/08/nist-cybersecurity-framework-ftc [https://perma.cc/
4ZA3-UQP7].
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See generally J. William Binkley, Fair Notice of Unfair Practices: Due Process in
FTC Data Security Enforcement After Wyndham, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1079 (2016);
David C. Grossman, Blaming the Victim: How FTC Data Security Enforcement Actions
Make Companies and Consumers More Vulnerable to Hackers, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1283 (2016); Jeffrey F. Addicott, Enhancing Cybersecurity in the Private Sector by Means
of Civil Liability Lawsuits— The Connie Francis Effect, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 857 (2017).
140. See Grossman, supra note 139, at 1304– 05; Addicott, supra note 139, at 892– 94.
141. See John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary,
PIVOT POINT SEC. (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/blog/nist-cyber-
security-framework/ [https://perma.cc/PEB3-ESZE].
142. Id.
143. See BUTHE ET AL., supra note 35, at 205. R
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therefore, becoming central to the establishment of the cybersecurity due
diligence requirements,144 as it is shaping the standard of care for the pri-
vate sector through private litigation.  In any event, the reasonableness
standard has a long tradition in many jurisdictions.  In the context of
cybersecurity, courts may apply the reasonableness standard established
under multistakeholderism and rely on expert testimony in litigation.
Concerns about legal liability thus become a strong incentive for compa-
nies to comply with the Internet norms that are not legally mandated but
that define best practice.145  That said, implementation of the Type IV stan-
dards have the potential to emerge as a de facto requirement for
companies.146
A common misunderstanding lies in the assumption that non-binding
standards are less frequently complied with when compared to mandatory
standards.147  This no longer holds true.  Those “private standards” under
multistakeholderism may be as constraining, if not more so, as traditional
regulations.148  Compliance with private regulations can be extremely
stringent.  Regulatory and judicial authorities have played significant roles
in reinforcing the rapid privatization of standard-setting.149
To conclude, private rule-making still takes place in political and legal
contexts at the domestic level, which is shaped by governments and
courts.150  Private standardization, by its nature, may not always be fully
autonomous.151  To a great extent, the Type IV cybersecurity standards are
“non-binding” but somehow “compulsory.”
D. International Standardization Bodies: The Openness Test?
Another interesting aspect is the exploration of whether a WTO mem-
ber, regardless of its status as a complainant or a respondent, can establish
an “international cybersecurity standard” within the meaning of TBT Arti-
cle 2.4,152 based on the fact that certain Type IV schemes are highly influ-
ential and thus constitute a “relevant international standard” within the
meaning of TBT Article 2.4.  In US– Tuna II (Mexico), the AB further con-
firmed that by virtue of Article 2.4, if a standard is found to constitute a
“relevant international standard,” WTO Members are required to use it or
144. Id. at 205– 06.
145. Id. at 6.
146. See Shackelford et al., supra note 20, at 225– 26, 256. R
147. See Pauwelyn, supra note 20, at 745.
148. Id.
149. See BUTHE ET AL., supra note 35, at 25. R
150. Id. at 25.
151. See Pauwelyn, supra note 20, at 746, 749. R
152. According to Article 2.4, technical regulations that use international standards
are presumed, subject to rebuttal, to be consistent with WTO obligations; on the other
hand, the use of a standard that differs from the pertinent international standard may be
challenged as an unnecessary trade barrier. See TBT Agreement, supra note 105, art.
2.4.
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its relevant parts, as a basis for their technical regulations.153
While the heart of the TBT is the adoption of international standards
for the sake of trade liberalization, the TBT does not define the term “inter-
national standards” per se.  The TBT committee attempted to clarify this
question but still found it hard to proceed.154  The AB in US– Tuna II stated
that in order to constitute an “international standard,” a standard must be
adopted by an “international standardizing body” for the purposes of the
TBT Agreement.155  A “standardizing body” does not need to have stand-
ardization as its principal function, or even as one of its principal func-
tions, as long as WTO Members “have reason to expect that the
international body in question is engaged in standardization activities.”156
In other words, such a “body” simply has to be “active in standardization,”
and the body’s activities in standardization “must be aware.”157  At the
crux of the issue is whether members should recognize the broader WTO
definition of “international standardization bodies or systems” contained
in Annex 1 of the TBT.  It seems that members would have sufficient room
to develop creative arguments regarding whether the Type IV regimes could
be “international standardizing bodies” under TBT Article 2.4.158
One tricky issue here is the key characteristics of multistakeholder
governance.  The AB in US– Tuna II argued that a body is “open” if member-
ship to the body is not restricted, and it is not “open” if membership is a
priori limited to the relevant bodies of only some WTO members.159  On
this point, it would be interesting to see how parties develop arguments
that the standards issued by such “transparent and inclusive” multis-
takeholder processes constitute a “relevant international standard” within
the meaning of TBT Article 2.4.160  Unlike the ISO, which has been labeled
a club dominated by private industrial groups where developing countries
and civil societies are excluded from information and decision-making pro-
cedures,161 the actors involved in emerging private cybersecurity platforms
are much more diverse, inclusive, and transparent.  The norms developed
are generally more carefully elaborated and are also supported by a broader
consensus.162  After all, transparency of inputs, process, and decision mak-
153. See Appellate Body Report, United States— Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 348, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R
(adopted May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, US– Tuna II].
154. See Lu, supra note 23, at 46– 47. See also Peng, supra note 22, at 142. R
155. Appellate Body Report, US-Tuna II, supra note 153, ¶¶ 355– 59.
156. Id. ¶ 362.
157. Id. ¶ 360.
158. If we proceed on the assumption that certain Type IV regulations are relevant
international standards within the meaning of Article 2.4., the next question is whether
such international standards would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the
fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued by any other WTO member.  The legiti-
mate objectives in Article 2.4 should be understood in the context of 2.2, as the lists of
legitimate objectives in 2.2 can be justifications for deviating from international stan-
dards. See also Peng, supra note 22, at 142– 43. R
159. See Appellate Body Report, US-Tuna II, supra note 153, ¶ 364.
160. See Arcuri, supra note 20, at 506. R
161. Id. at 495, 512.
162. See Pauwelyn, supra note 20, at 747– 48.
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ing is fundamental to the Internet.163
Conclusion
The following questions were raised at the outset of this Article: how
can the WTO be saved from the risk of irrelevance?  How can the WTO
become a forum for trade disputes concerning “private, voluntary” cyber-
security standards created through a multistakeholder process?  How can
governments be held accountable for Type IV regimes in situations in
which they impose unjustified barriers to trade?  To answer the question as
to whether the TBT Agreement is still relevant, four specific challenges are
examined: a challenge to the definition of “technical regulation,” a chal-
lenge to determination of “government action,” a challenge to the distinc-
tion of “voluntary/mandatory” compliance, and a challenge to the
recognition of the “international standardization bodies” for cybersecurity.
The business sector has actively taken on the standardization initia-
tive.  More and more jurisdictions have been settling on a bottom-up
approach to cybersecurity policymaking, which aims to minimize
mandatory governmental regulation and to favor a voluntary private-sector
standard to enhance cybersecurity.  To analyze the privatization of govern-
ance in a systematic way, this Article placed the “top-down” and “bottom-
up” approaches in such a context that allows us to identify the features of
different types of cybersecurity standard-setting and to recognize the chal-
lenges to international economic order.  Given that the political and eco-
nomic stakes in cybersecurity standard-setting can be enormous, it is
difficult, if not impossible, for national or regional standards to win out
over other standards as the global standard after a period of public rule-
making competition among public regulators.  As a result, at the crux of
the matter is whether Type IV standards can become de facto international
standards due to their broad acceptance in the market.  If in fact they can,
what are the impacts of such a phenomenon on the WTO?
In conclusion, Type IV standardization activities generate many inter-
pretive issues.  At the heart of the controversy lies the determination of a
“government act.”  The blurring of public and private and the changing
architecture of the state render the identification of “the degree of govern-
mental involvement” a rather complex area.  The concept of a “technical
regulation” should be broadly construed in order to cope with the trend of
the “privatization of regulation.”  However, if such an interpretative
approach becomes overbroad, it may compromise the legal certainty and
predictability of the TBT Agreement, creating the risk that Members will be
subject to WTO dispute settlement proceedings even when they did not
effectively control the standard-setting process.  After all, cybersecurity “co-
regulation” has shifted the role of government in such a way that it no
longer retains general oversight authority to approve and enforce stan-
dards.  Moreover, this Article stresses that cybersecurity standardization
163. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 87, at 10.
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under multistakeholderism is “non-binding” but also somehow “compul-
sory.”  Regulators and judges frequently resort to private standards to give
meaning to concepts in law, more specifically, when evaluating duty of
care in negligence cases.  The so-called “private, voluntary” standards are
shaping the standard of care for the private sector and at the same time are
becoming central to the establishment of cybersecurity due diligence
requirements.
Finally, cyberspace governance is a complex problem.  The fact that
certain informal norms have the potential to become de facto international
standards creates a renewed sense of urgency for the WTO to take action in
order to avoid the fate of being eclipsed into irrelevance in the domain of
cyberspace governance.  Eventually, the WTO panels and the AB might
have to engage in judicial interpretation of private norms governing cyber-
space, and in particular, the inevitable clashes between multilateralism and
multistakeholderism.
